▪ We knew that companies deployed their scientists into the UN IPCC process. We now know some of how those scientists reported back to the companies about this process and more about how the industry was processing the science and designing strategies to maintain ‘uncertainty’. ▪ Industry representatives were briefed in detail on the increasing consensus, which was largely consistent with what their own scientists had observed, modeled and predicted in the 1970s and 1980s. Case studies in our presentation: a. 1980 Exxon’s Natuna gas project1 In 1980, Exxon struggled to find a way to exploit a huge gas find north of Borneo in Indonesian territory. The gas deposit contained over 70% carbon dioxide. Exxon scientists designed a number of ways to ‘dispose’ of the CO2, but abandoned the project upon realizing that they would be the largest point source of carbon on Earth. This realization was at least a decade ahead of any plausible international greenhouse gas regulatory regime. b. 1982 Exxon memos to management2 Two separate memos written internally at Exxon Research and Engineering Company in April 1982 “CO2 Greenhouse Effect A Technical Review” and November 12, 1982 memo titled “CO2 Greenhouse Effect”. The memos lays out the results of their own comparative climate modeling runs, named for example “Exxon 21st Century Study High Growth scenario” graphing the “Most Probable Temperature Increase” through 2080. The November memo states “this material has been given wide circulation to Exxon management…” and that while fine to use as a basis for discussion, the material “should be restricted to Exxon personnel and not distributed externally.” c. 1988 Exxon “The Greenhouse Effect”3 This document summarizes the internal knowledge of the emerging issue and lays out what appears to have been the default “Exxon position” at the time, to “emphasize the uncertainty in scientific conclusions regarding the potential enhanced greenhouse effect.” and to “Resist the overstatement and sensationalization of potential greenhouse effect which could lead to the non economic development of non fossil fuel resources. 1 G.R. Gervasi, Esso Eastern Inc., “CO2 Emissions: Natuna Gas Project,” Feb. 3, 1981 (available at http://www.climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/1981-letter-from-esso-to-exxon-natuna-gasproject-co2-emissions/). 2M.B. Glaser, Exxon Research and Engineering Company, “CO2 ‘Greenhouse’ Effect,” Nov. 12, 1982 (available at http://www.climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/1982-memo-to-exxon-management-aboutco2-greenhouse-effect/); Coordination and Planning Division, Exxon Research and Engineering Company, “CO2 Greenhouse Effect: A Technical Overview,” Apr. 1, 1982 (available at http://www.climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/1982-memo-to-exxon-management-about-co2greenhouse-effect/). 3Joseph M. Carlson, Exxon, “The Greenhouse Effect,” Aug. 3, 1988 (available at http://www.climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/566/). Climate Investigations Center - September 2018 page 2