shown in the Quitclaim which complainant signed on 28 October 1996. On that day, the employer-employee relations of complainant and respondents ceased. It was in January, 1997, when complainant reapplied for another employment contract with respondents and when he had to undergo a medical test that this illness of Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease with Ischemia was diagnosed. By this time, he was not yet employed with respondents. The records even show that he withdrew his application on 7 February 1997. In April 29, 1997, he filed this case. We cannot agree with complainant that this illness was with him already while he was employed with respondents for as pointed out by respondents in their Reply and Appeal, complainant failed to show proof that his illness was work-connected or that he was suffering from it already while he was on board Helikon. It is then erroneous for the Labor Arbiter to apply the POEA Standard Employment Contract and TCC-CBA either for disability benefits or medical expense reimbursement in favor of complainant in the absence of employment relations. xxxxxx Consequently, the award of damages and attorneys fees must be deleted. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision appealed from is VACATED and a new one entered DISMISSING instant complaint for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated January 29, 1999. Consequently, on April 14, 1999, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint; in finding that he was diagnosed with hypertensive cardiovascular disease; and in declaring unfit for duty after the termination of his services. In a Decision dated September 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC Decision, holding that: