4/29/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly July 19, 2007, when he came home upon completion of his contract, and November 6, 2007, when Dr. Dacanay declared him fit to work, he had been under examination and treatment (with the necessary medical procedures) by the company specialists. All the while, the petitioners shouldered his medical expenses, professional fees and costs of his therapy sessions. In short, the petitioners attended to his health condition despite the expiration of his contract. We, therefore, find it puzzling why Dumadag did not bring to the petitioners’ attention the contrary opinions of his doctors and suggest that they seek a third opinion. Whatever his reasons might have been, Dumadag’s disregard of the conflict-resolution procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA cannot and should not be tolerated and allowed to stand, lest it encourage a similar defiance. We stress in this respect that we have yet to come across a case where the parties referred conflicting assessments of a seafarer’s disability to a third doctor since the procedure was introduced by the POEASEC in 2000 – whether the Court’s ruling in a particular case upheld the assessment of the company-designated physician, as in Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division)[33] and similar other cases, or sustained the opinion of the seafarer’s chosen physician as in HFS Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar,[34] cited by the CA, and other cases similarly resolved. The third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC, it appears to us, has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the parties’ level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were brought to court. Given the circumstances under which Dumadag pursued his claim, especially the fact that he caused the non-referral to a third doctor, Dr. Dacanay’s fit-to-work certification must be upheld. In Santiago v. Pacbasin Ship Management, Inc.,[35] the Court declared: "[t]here was no agreement on a third doctor who shall examine him anew and whose finding shall be final and binding. x x x [T]his Court is left without choice but to uphold the certification made by Dr. Lim with respect to Santiago’s disability." On a different plane, Dumadag cannot insist that the "favorable" reports of his physicians be chosen over the certification of the company-designated physician, especially if we were to consider that the physicians he consulted examined him for only a day (or shorter) on four different dates between December 5, 2007 and April 13, 2008. Moreover, we point out that they merely relied on the same medical history, diagnoses and analyses provided by the company-designated specialists. Under the circumstances, we cannot simply say that their findings are more reliable than the conclusions of the company-designated physicians. Finally, we find the pronouncement that Dumadag’s non-hiring by the petitioners as the most convincing proof of his illness or disability without basis. There is no evidence on record showing that he sought re-employment with the petitioners or that it was a matter of course for the petitioners to re-hire him after the expiration of his contract. Neither is there evidence on Dumadag’s claim that he applied with other manning agencies, but was turned down due to his illness. All told, we find the petition meritorious. elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/55919 8/10