Separate Concurring Opinion 6 G.R. No. 224469 the same with result to absurd consequen~es.~Further, as in People v. De Gracia22 and Mendoza vs People, 23 temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless commission of prohibited acts were considered as an indication of the absence of an intent to perpetrate the offense. In the United States, the legislature's authority to define criminal acts, and dispense with the requirement of criminal intent for their conviction, is also equally settled. 24 The State may, in the exercise of police power, impose regulatory measures where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se. Such class of offenses, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, do not require a specific criminal intent. 25 However, there are cases where US federal courts order the defendants' acquittal for prohibitory offenses if it is established that they had no knowledge of the prohibition. In Lambert v. California, 26 the US Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction for violating a Los Angeles Municipal Code that makes it a criminal offense a felon, convicted elsewhere in California, to be present in Los Angeles without registering with the police. The US Supreme Court explained that conviction is improper if it was not established that the defendant knew the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge. The New York district court applied the same reasoning in United States v. Barnes, 27 when it reversed the conviction of the defendant, a convicted sex offender in New York, who moved to New Jersey in 2005 without informing the requisite authorities in either state. In that case, the district court found that the defendant could not have complied with the federal law requiring him to update his residence information despite state law necessitating the same procedure. The Court found that the federal and state laws differ in that the latter provided for a dramatically lesser penalty than the former. It also noted the impossibility of compliance since the defendant had no knowledge, at the time he moved to New Jersey and prior to the promulgation of the federal rule, that ihe same would have retroactive application. Significantly, the US Supreme Court has always considered the complexities of the subject prohibitory law in fixing the standard of specific criminal intent required for their prosecution. For instance, in Cheek v. 22 23 24 25 26 27 Supra at note 13. Supra at note 22. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (U.S. March 27, 1922); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952). United States Allard, 397 F. Supp. 429 (D. Mont. July 21, 1975). 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct. 240 (1957). 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53245 (S.D.N.Y. 23 July 2007). v.