6/7/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly involve a curtailment on the right to travel within the Philippines and the right to travel to the Philippines. This case presents us with an opportunity to revisit Marcos and abandon its narrow and restrictive interpretation. In this regard, the constitutional provision should be read to include travel within the Philippines and travel to and from the Philippines. Undeniably, the right to travel is not absolute. Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution states that any curtailment must be based on "national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law." In interpreting this constitutional provision, the ponencia proposes that only a statute or a legislative enactment may impair the right to travel. Respectfully, I disagree. In my view, the phrase "as may be provided by law" should not be literally interpreted to mean statutory law. Its usage should depend upon the context in which it is written. As used in the Constitution, the word "law" does not only refer to statutes but embraces the Constitution itself. The Bill of Rights is replete with provisions that provide a similar phraseology. For instance, both the due process clause and the equal protection clause under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution contain the word "law," thus: Article III BILL OF RIGHTS Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis supplied) However, the application of the due process and the equal protection clauses has not been limited to statutory law. These two (2) principles have been tested even against executive issuances. In Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[4] the due process clause was deemed to have been violated by an executive order which directed the outright confiscation of carabaos transported from one province to another. In declaring the executive order unconstitutional, this Court held: [T]he challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/64165 61/70