Dissenting Opinion - 20 - G.R. No. 224469 In fact, it is clear from the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee that the IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the IPs: CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8 126 rights to ancestral domain, this is where we transferred the other provision but here itselfHON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may be allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources b"ecause we all agree that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could be exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas should be done in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this has been disturbing our people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers or the secretariat could just propose a provision for incorporation here so that maybe the right to consultation and the right to be compensated when there are damages within their ancestral lands. 56 Hence, even when former Chief Justice Puno found basis to believe that ancestral domains do not belong to the public domain, he nevertheless categorically declared that the IP right does not extend to the natural resources thereon. 57 In line with this, Justice Kapunan similarly declared that 56 See Separate Opinion of Justice Kapunan m Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 49, at 1064. 57 Former Chief Justice Puno stated: Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the regalian doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/lPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a). The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution-as belonging to the State. The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine. The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA is allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/lPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a,superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses. Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. (Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resol/urces, supra note 49, at 933-1010. [,,