sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge. Contrary to law. (emphasis and words in brackets added) Interestingly, the acts constitutive of the offense, as alleged in the Information, could make out a case for violation of either Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 or Rape under the RPC.[40] Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the finding that Malta is criminally liable for violation of RA 7610, and not for Rape. The Court is not unmindful of its pronouncements in People v. Abello (Abello)[41] and Cabila v. People (Cabila)[42] that the second element must specifically be alleged in the Information and thereafter proved. However, these rulings cannot support petitioner's prayer that he be convicted under Art. 336 of the RPC instead of under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. To begin with, the factual milieu of Abello significantly differs with that in the case at bar. Our refusal to convict therein accused Heracleo Abello was premised on the the fact that his victim cannot be considered as a "child" within the purview of RA 7610.[43] The victim in Abello, was 21 years of age when the offense was committed. Although she had polio, the prosecution failed to substantiate through evidence that the victim's physical condition rendered her incapable of fully taking care of herself or of protecting herself against sexual abuse.[44] Hence, Abello was only convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC. Cabila, on the other hand, is a stray division case that has seemingly been overturned by the Court's recent en banc ruling in Dimakuta v. People (Dimakuta).[45] The latter case attempted to punctuate the discussion on the issue at hand, but fell short as the conviction therein for violation of Art. 336 of the RPC had already attained finality. Instead, what the Court en banc was confronted with in , the bone of contention that remained, was whether or not an accused is disqualified to apply for probation even if such appeal resulted in the reduction of the non-probationable penalty imposed to a probationable one. The Court, therefore, deems it more appropriate here to categorically abandon our ruling in Cabila. Neither can petitioner buttress his claim by citing the dissent in the 2005 case of Olivarez v. CA[46] wherein it was expounded thus: The first element refers to the acts of lasciviousness that the accused performs on the child. The second element refers to the special circumstance that the child (is) exploited in prostitution.or subjected to other sexual abuse. This special circumstance already exists when the accused performs acts of lasciviousness on the child. In short, the acts of lasciviousness that the accused performs on the child