5/28/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly 2006. Concededly, the period September 18, 2005 to April 19, 2006 is less than the statutory 240-day – or 8-month – period. Nonetheless, it is impossible to expect that by May 19, 2006, or on the last day of the statutory 240-day period, respondent would be declared fit to work when just recently – or on February 24, 2006 – he underwent coronary artery bypass graft surgery; by then, respondent would not have sufficiently recovered. In other words, it became evident as early as April 19, 2006 that respondent was permanently and totally disabled, unfit to return to work as seafarer and earn therefrom, given his delicate post-operative condition; a definitive assessment by Dr. Cruz before May 19, 2006 was unnecessary. Respondent would to all intents and purposes still be unfit for sea-duty. Even then, with Dr. Cruz’s failure to issue a definite assessment of respondent’s condition on May 19, 2006, or the last day of the statutory 240-day period, respondent was thus deemed totally and permanently disabled pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code and Rule X, Section 2 of the AREC. Premature labor complaint Neither may it be argued by the petitioners that respondent’s filing of the labor complaint on February 10, 2006 should affect the outcome of the case. It is difficult to blame respondent for deciding to sue, considering that he has been diagnosed by no less than three separate physicians – Drs. Dizon, Vicaldo, and Cruz – with severe threevessel coronary artery disease which required bypass procedure. Respondent may have been acting under a sense of extreme urgency given the life-threatening nature of his illness. The filing of the labor complaint may have been designed to pressure petitioners into taking action to address his condition, or to recover expenses should he decide to proceed with the bypass procedure on his own. Either way, the Court cannot subscribe to the view that there was a premature resort to litigation since respondent was still undergoing treatment for his illness and the company-designated physician has not completed treatment and made a definite assessment of his condition. Indeed, it may even be said that with Dr. Cruz’s February 2, 2006 diagnosis that respondent was suffering from severe three-vessel coronary artery disease which required immediate bypass graft procedure or surgery, respondent believed himself permanently and totally disabled which thus led him to demand disability benefits and thereafter file the labor case when petitioners ignored his demand. Attorney’s fees On the issue of attorney’s fees, while petitioners have not been shown to act in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent’s demands, it is nonetheless true as a matter of law and it has been held in the past that where an employee is forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his right and interest, he is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award at the time of actual payment.[37] WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed April 20, 2010 Decision and July 21, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107330 are AFFIRMED elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/56669 10/14