(other than loss of sight of one eye or both eyes or loss of limb) Verily, the benefits provided therein are far greater than mandated by law which is P50,000.00 for death due to accident. In an appeal dated February 26, 1993, the complainants questioned the aforesaid decision. They, however, limited their appeal to claims for additional vacation pay and insurance coverage. xxx xxx xxx (I)t then follows that to the extent that the POEA has concluded that there is "no case of underpayment at bar," the same has to be bindingly observed by us vis-a-vis complainants' submitted issue in their draft decision of "(2) whether or not there had been underpayments as claimed by appellants under the provisions of PD 442." Moreover, on June 13, 1995, the Second Division of this Commission dismissed complainants' appeal "for lack of merit." At the end of its extended resolution, the Commission concluded that the complainants failed "to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which" they based their claims. xxx xxx xxx This thus disposes the third and fourth issues advanced by complainants for our resolution in their earlier mentioned draft resolution. xxx xxx xxx Even the first issue submitted to us for our resolution (which, in their draft resolution, has been defined by complainants as "whether or not the lumpsum mode of payment of appellants' monthly salary is legal") was, for all legal intents and purposes, already resolved in that other case for inherently submitted for the resolution of the POEA and the Second Division of this Commission in that other case was the question of whether or not the "fixed salary" mode of payment stipulated in the parties' contract was valid. The POEA Administrator could not have concluded that "we see no case of underpayment at bar" if, in his opinion, the parties' "fixed salary" mode of compensation was illegal, aware that such declaration of nullity was precisely the end-goal of complainants' complaint. Similarly, the NLRC Second Division would not have dismissed complainants' appeal if it were of the view, as argued by complainants, that respondent SOS' lumpsum mode of payment was illegal. Indeed, our resolving said first issue anew would amount to a duplicitous exercise of appellate jurisdiction."iii[3] On January 17, 1996, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In an Orderiv[4] dated January 30, 1996, the respondent NLRC denied petitioners' motion.