Another allegation in the omnibus motion ... is that, plaintiff is engaged in forum-shopping which merits the dismissal of the petition because there is a pending criminal complaint for violation of R.A. 9262 with the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati City, which is docketed as I.S. No. 05E-6413 and handled by Asst. City Prosecutor [Romel Odronia]. The said criminal complaint involves the same parties and the same issue. The Court is not persuaded. Granting arguendo that violation of R.A. 9262 is included in the criminal complaint; the Asst. City Prosecutor is devoid of power to issue a Temporary Protection Order. Consequently, the aggrieved party in R.A. 9262 would have no other immediate recourse but to file a TPO before the court. [66] Failing in the most basic requisites of forum shopping — there not having been an actual or potential final judgment on the merits rendered by a competent court in the course of criminal proceedings - petitioner's allegations regarding respondent Mendenilla's alleged lack of personality to file suit and forum shopping must fail. II Petitioner further assails the manner of service of summons. He claims that service of summons upon his employee, Tolentino, at Unit 1503, Grand Tower Condominium, 150 L.P. Leviste St., Makati City, [67] while he was out of the country was ineffectual and failed to vest jurisdiction over his person in the Regional Trial Court. He theorizes that in cases where a temporary protection order is issued ex parte by a trial court, the temporary protection order itself is the summons.[68] He adds that Section 15 of the Anti-VAWC Law and Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC stipulate personal service — and absolutely no other means of service — of the temporary protection order upon the respondent.[69] Thus, service through Tolentino was ineffectual. II.A Petitioner's overly pedantic appreciation of the Anti-VAWC Law and of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC is grossly erroneous. The non-use of the precise term "summons" in the Anti-VAWC Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and its procedural rules provided in A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC does not justify the equation of a temporary protection order with summons and the exclusion of the use of summons. The nature and purpose of summons is markedly different from those of a protection order. This prevents the latter from being a substitute for the former. Summons is a procedural tool. It is a writ by which the defendant is notified that an action was brought against him or her.[70] In an action in personam, brought to enforce personal rights and obligations, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is mandatory. In such actions, therefore, summonses serve not only to notify the defendant of the filing of an action, but also to enable acquisition of jurisdiction over his person.[71] A protection order is not a procedural mechanism, which is imperative for the progression of an initiated action. Rather, it is itself a substantive relief which "prevent[s] further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of [the Anti-VAWC Law] and granting other necessary relief."[72] Protection orders issued by courts come in two (2) forms: temporary and permanent. The distinction, as their respective names denote, is their duration. A temporary protection order is provisional, whereas a permanent protection order is lasting or final. When a case is of particular urgency, a trial court may ex parte issue a temporary protection order, granting the reliefs under Section 8 of the Anti-VAWC Law in the interim, that is, for a 30-day period.[73] Precisely because the case is of such particular urgency that a temporary protection order is deemed necessary. Section 15 of the AntiVAWC Law includes a stipulation that the temporary protection order must be immediately personally served on the respondent. It provides, "The court shall order the immediate personal service of the [temporary protection order] on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service." To determine whether the temporary protection order should be made permanent and a complete, substantive relief extended to the alleged victim, Section 15 of the Anti-VAWC Law mandates the conduct of hearing within the 30-day effectivity of the temporary protection order. The clear and specific singular purpose of the hearing is manifest in Section 15: "[t]he court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [permanent protection order] prior to or on the date of the expiration of the [temporary protection order]." Because a hearing is to be conducted, the respondent must necessarily be informed. Thus, Section 15 further states that, "[t]he [temporary protection order] shall include