Decision 27 G.R. No. 224469 Constitution, the statutes like IPRA and a host of others like the ones mentioned by Justice Leonen in his Opinion, the sundry administrative regulations (one of which Chief Justice Peralta and Justice Caguioa have taken pains to outline) which seek to reconcile the regalian doctrine and the civilist concept of ownership with the indigenous peoples' sui generis ownership of ancestral domains and lands, the international covenants like the United Nations Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples, of which our country is a signatory, and Philippine and international jurisprudence which identifies the forms and contents of IP rights. We hasten to add though that this recognition has not transformed into a definitive and categorical rule oflaw on its impact as a defense in criminal cases against IPs arising from the exercise of their IP rights. The ensuing unfortunate confusion as to true and inescapable merits of these rights in criminal cases justifies the claim that petitioners' guilt for this ma/um prohibitum offense is reasonably doubtful. As succinctly tackled by Justice Caguioa in his opinion: "In any case, and as aptly noted by the Chief Justice's dissent, doubts have been cast as to the applicability of the IPRA to the present case, and since such doubt is on whether or not the petitioners were well-within their rights when they cut the dita tree, such doubt must be resolved to stay the Court's hand from affirming their conviction." He further opines that the invocation of IP rights in the case at bar has "risen to the heights of contested constitutional interpretations .... " While we do not share Justice Caguioa's opinion in full, we agree with him at least that there is reasonable doubt as regards the accused' guilt of the offense charged. Thus: On this note, it may be well to remember that the case of Cruz which dealt with the constituti~nality of the provisions of the IPRA was decided by an equally divided Court. This only goes to show that there are still nuances concerning the rights of IPs within their ancestral land and domain that are very much open to varying interpretations. Prescinding from this jurisprudential history, perhaps the instant case may not provide the most sufficient and adequate venue to resolve the issues brought about by this novel piece of legislation. It would be the height of unfairness to burden the instant case against petitioners with the need to resolve the intricate Constitutional matters brought about by their mere membership in the IP community especially since a criminal case, being personal in nature, affects their liberty as the accused. The members of the Comi may argue one way or the other, but no length of legal debate will remove from the fact that this case is still about two men who acted pursuant to precisely the kind of cultural choice and community-based environmental agency that they believe IPRA contemplated they had the freedom to exercise. The petitioners hang their liberty on the question of whether or not IPRA, vis-a-vis forestry laws, has to be "measured against an objective standard, that of a rational and informed discussion within the framework of the statutory regime .... good faith bargaining includes rational discussion, consultation and reasonable efforts. Judging the objective component of good faith bargaining requires the judge to assess how the parties carried OH the rational discussion, consultation and reasonable efforts."