As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined. The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted) The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC. Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall. Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262. Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60 A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations: Wednesday, December 10, 2003 Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?