On appeal, the NLRC in its Decision dated June 25, 1997, sustained the Labor Arbiter’s findings and conclusions.[45]  When the NLRC Decision dated June 25, 1997 was elevated to this Court via a petition for certiorari, the First Division, in a minute resolution dated January 14, 1998[46] dismissed the petition for failure to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned judgment.  The resolution became final and executory on February 16, 1998.   The Lazaga case is not stare decisis to the present case since the factual circumstances surrounding each case is different. The contracts of employment of Lazaga and respondent spanned different periods.  Lazaga’s contract was from July 26, 1994 toJuly 26, 1995 and she opted to extend her employment until her repatriation on February 15, 1996, while herein respondent Paragaswas employed from December 14, 1994 to December 13, 1995. Furthermore, the contract stipulations in their respective contracts have not been shown to be the same.  Lazaga’s contract of employment is not part of the evidence on record for a detailed comparison with respondent’s contract.  Besides, evidence to establish their respective claims for salary differential, night shift differential, full attendance bonus and excessive placement fee are different.    Verily, the resolution of the interpretation of the respondent’s contract and her entitlement to salary differential, night shift differential, full attendance bonus and excessive placement fee requires conscientious evaluation and assessment of the evidence adduced by the parties, which is best undertaken by the Labor Arbiter. This Court is not the proper venue to consider factual issues nor is it its function to analyze or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.  Needless to stress, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.[47]  Ordinarily, the case should be