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The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.14 Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof." Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature.15 The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.16 As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14 pertinently provides: SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay

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Tua v. Judge Mangrobang

Jurisprudence

Case number: G.R. No. 170701

Division: PH Supreme Court Third Division

Date of decision: Jan 22, 2014

Year of decision: 2014

GBV Case Type

Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (VAWC)

Nature of the case: The victim filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition for herself and in behalf of her minor children, for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her husband. The victim claimed that she and her children had suffered from petitioner’s abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually deprived of custody and access to her minor children; and, that she was threatened to be deprived of her and her children’s financial support. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals in upholding the Regional Trial Court's issuance of the Temporary Protection Order. The Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite is hereby ORDERED to resolve with dispatch the victim’s for a Permanent Protection Order.

Summary of outcome: The accused particularly directs his constitutional attack on Section 15 of RA 9262 contending that had there been no ex parte issuance of the TPO, he would have been afforded due process of law and had properly presented his side on the matter; that the questioned provision simply encourages arbitrary enforcement repulsive to basic constitutional rights which affects his life, liberty and property. The Court was not impressed. The Court posited that the protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The accused also claimed that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO as the petition was bereft of any indication of grounds for the issuance of the same. He contends that the allegations in respondent's affidavit attached to the petition, and without admitting the same to be true, are nothing more than normal or usual quarrels between a husband and wife which are not grave or imminent enough to merit the issuance of a TPO. The Court is again not persuaded and ruled that the factual matters herein raised by him should be presented during the hearing on the merits on the issuance of the Permanent Protection Order.

Observatory: Gender-Based Violence

Affected Sector

Women

Ponente: PERALTA, J.

Long title: RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA, Respondents.

Geolocation 1

Latitude: 14.42893

Longitude: 120.936519

: Geolocation 1

Primary Documents

RALPH P. TUA.pdf
English
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Commission on Human Rights

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Tua v. Judge Mangrobang

Primary Documents

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