Separate Concurring Opinion 9 G.R. No. 224469 evolution principle", because they are not grounded in traditional Maliseet culture. I find this submission to . be contrary to the established jurisprudence of this Court, which has consistently held that ancestral rights may find modern form: Mitchell, at para. 13. In Span-ow, Dickson C.J. explained that "the phrase 'existing aboriginal rights' must be interpreted :flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time." Citing Professor Slattery, he stated that "the word 'existing' suggests that those rights are· 'affirmed· in a contemporary form rather than in their primeval simplicity and vigour.' In Mitchell, McLachlin C.J. drew a distinction between the particular aboriginal right, which is established at the moment of contact, and its expression, which evolves over time. L'Heureux-Dube J. in dissent in Van der Peet emphasized that "aboriginal rights must be permitted to maintain contemporary relevance in relation to the needs of the natives as their practices, traditions and customs change and evolve with the overall society in which they live." If aboriginal rights are not permitted to evolve and take modem forms, then they will become utterly useless. Surely the Crown cannot be suggesting that the respondents, all of whom live on a reserve, would be limited to building wigwams. If such were the case, the doctrine of aboriginal rights would truly be limited to recognizing and affirming a narrow subset of "anthropological curiosities," and our notion of aboriginality would be reduced to a small number of outdated stereotypes. The cultures of the aboriginal peoples who occupied the lands now forming Canada prior to the arrival of the Europeans, and who did so while living in organized societies with their own distinctive ways of life, cannot be. reduced to wigwams, baskets and canoes. (Emphasis ours) · The peculiar circumstances of this case require the same liberal approach. This Court simply cannot brush aside petitioners' cultural heritage in the determmation of their criminal liability. Unlike the accused in People v. De Gracia, petitioners cannot be presumed to know the import and legal consequence of their act. Their circumstances, specifically their access to information, and their customs as members of a cultural minority, are substantial factors that distinguish them from the rest of the population. Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, in his Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Secretary a/Environment and Natural Resources, 32 explained it aptly: Indigenous .peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of selfgovernment not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the population. The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erpde their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much o]der base of archipelagic culture. The 32 G.R. No. 135385, 06 December 2000: 400 Phil. 904-1115 (2000).