territory, even if initiated abroad.32 Both principles therefore allow States to regulate conduct with an extra-territorial element. If the conduct is neither initiated nor completed within their territory, States may assert jurisdiction over conduct that has an “effect” on their territory. APF and GANHRI point out how the effects doctrine33 was developed to give States “more leeway to unilaterally stretch the arm of their domestic laws in order to clamp down on harmful acts arising beyond their borders.”34 The effects doctrine has been acknowledged in the Lotus case35 and by judges of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case.36 It is presently widely applied, especially in relation to antitrust, tort, bribery and corruption, security, insolvency, and criminal law.37 The US has a long history of regulating conduct outside its territory.38 The effects doctrine has been corroborated by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1945 in the Alcoa case, where Judge Learned Hand noted: It is settled law…that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders, which the state reprehends.39 Plan B’s brief argues that the principle is the logical counterpart of the “no harm principle” in public international law,40 which is specifically referenced in the preamble to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law ... the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Plan B notes that it follows that where States fail to prevent activities within their jurisdiction damaging the environment beyond their borders, the affected States should have jurisdiction over the relevant conduct. Such an extension of jurisdiction is also consistent with 32 Id. See H.L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict. 57 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 631 (2009), available at http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=facpub. 34 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction Towards a Reasonableness Test, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 194 (Malcolm Langford ed. 2013). 35 S.S. Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 23; see also ELAW brief, at pgs. 4-5. 36 Arrest Warrant 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 63 (Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins, J., Kooijmans, J., and Buergenthal, J.). 37 See INT’L BAR ASSOC. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION (2009), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=ECF39839-A217-4B3D-8106-DAB716B34F1E (providing an overview). 38 See, e.g., CHARLES DOYLE, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW, Congressional Research Service, 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-166.pdf; APF & GANHRI brief, at ¶ 21. 39 APF & GANHRI brief, at ¶ 20 (quoting U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)). 40 See amicus curiae brief submitted by Plan B, at § 2.1, https://businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Plan%20B.pdf [hereinafter Plan B brief]. 33 16