6/5/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly Indeed, the NLRC only included the award of attorney’s fees in the dispositive portion of the Decision dated 8 March 2011 without a discussion as to the basis therefor. A Final Note In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency v. Dumadag,[51] the Court lamented: The third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC, it appears to us, has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the parties’ level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were brought to court.[52] In this case, the third-doctor-referral provision did not find application because of the lack of a definitive disability assessment by the company-designated physician. However, the respondents believed, nay, insisted, that the 24 March 2009 disability rating of 8% was the final assessment of their designated physician. When Carcedo submitted the contrary findings of his personal physician, respondents presented the opinions of five more doctors, in rebuttal, just to say that Carcedo could have been declared fit for sea duty if he were to re-apply for the same position of chief mate. At that point in time, the parties were yet before the Labor Arbiter, who could have facilitated the election of the third doctor. We would like to remind ship owners, manning companies and seafarers of their respective obligations as regards the third doctor provision. In INC Shipmanagement, Incorporated v. Rosales, we held: To definitively clarify how a conflict situation should be handled, upon notification that the seafarer disagrees with the company doctor’s assessment based on the duly and fully disclosed contrary assessment from the seafarer’s own doctor, the seafarer shall then signify his intention to resolve the conflict by the referral of the conflicting assessments to a third doctor whose ruling, under the POEA-SEC, shall be final and binding on the parties. Upon notification, the company carries the burden of initiating the process for the referral to a third doctor commonly agreed between the parties. In Bahia, we said: In the absence of any request from him (as shown by the records of the case), the employer-company cannot be expected to respond. As the party seeking to impugn the certification that the law itself recognizes as prevailing, Constantino bears the burden of positive action to prove that his doctor’s findings are correct, as well as the burden to notify the company that a contrary finding had been made by his own physician. Upon such notification, the company must itself respond by setting into motion the process of choosing a third doctor who, as the POEAelibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/59949 14/19