We also know that when Theodor Sterling made recommendations after a feasibility study for the cigarette companies, he based those recommendations on a model developed by the petroleum companies – a model the cigarette companies would later lambast for its effectiveness in legitimizing shoddy, industry-favoring research. We also know, directly, that the Smoke and Fumes Committee of the American Petroleum Institute was designed deliberately to affect regulation, and that we have one personal account of the methods by which the industry would use seemingly independent research institutes to produce favorable science. It should not be surprising that the cigarette industry also contracted extensively with Stanford Research Institute.119 119 See, e.g., Memorandum from David E. Townsend, RJR, to M. E. Stowe, (Nov. 30, 1978) (on file with University of California, San Francisco), available at https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=pkyf0082; memorandum from R. L. Johnson to W. L. DeWitt (Mar. 13, 1975) (on file with University of California, San Francisco), available at https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=tspm0139; proposal for research prepared by Edward M. Liston, et al., Stanford Research Institute (Dec. 9, 1975) (on file with University of California, San Francisco), available at https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=mzbm0088. 21