04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly in dealing with the MILF, the Mindanao peace and order problem, and the plight of our Muslim brothers in the long term. It should enjoy the full range of these options - from changes in our constitutional and statutory framework to full support in waging war, if and when necessary - subject only to the observance of constitutional and statutory limits. In a negotiation situation, the worse situation we can saddle the Executive with is to wittingly or unwittingly telegraph the Executive's moves and our own weaknesses to the MILF through our eagerness to forestall constitutional violations. We can effectively move as we have shown in this MOA-AD affair, but let this move be at the proper time and while we ourselves observe the limitations the Constitution commonly impose on all branches of government in delineating their respective roles. v. The Need for Guidelines from this Court The cases of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, and Lacson v. Perez presented a novel issue that uncovered a gray area in our Constitution: in the absence of a specific constitutional provision, does the President have the power to declare a state of rebellion/national emergency? If the answer is in the affirmative, what are the consequences of this declaration? David v. Macapagal-Arroyo answered these questions and went on to further clarify that a declaration of a state of national emergency did not necessarily authorize the President to exercise emergency powers such as the power to take over private enterprises under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution. Prior to this case, the correlation between Section 17, Article XII and the emergency powers of the President under Section 23 (2), Article VI has never been considered. In contrast, the present petitions and the intervening developments do not now present similar questions that necessitate clarification. Since the MOA-AD does not exist as a legal, effective, and enforceable instrument, it can neither be illegal nor unconstitutional. For this reason, I have not bothered to refute the statements and arguments about its unconstitutionality. I likewise see no reason to wade into the realm of international law regarding the concerns of some of my colleagues in this area of law. Unless signed and duly executed, the MOA-AD can only serve as unilateral notes or a "wish list" as some have taken to calling it. If it will serve any purpose at all, it can at most serve as an indicator of how the internal processes involving the peace negotiations are managed at the Office of the President. But these are matters internal to that Office so that this Court cannot interfere, not even to make suggestions on how procedural mistakes made in arriving at the aborted MOA-AD should be corrected. To be sure, for this Court to issue guidelines relating to unapplied constitutional provisions would be a useless exercise worse than the "defanging of paper tigers" that Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga abhorred in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.[24] In terms of the results of this exercise, the words of former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary are most apt - "nothing is gained by breathing life into a dead issue."[25] vi. The "Capable of Repetition but Evading Review" Exception elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/47263 127/203