5/28/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly ASSESSMENT DUE TO RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL ABANDONMENT. III. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN DEVIATING FROM THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. VS. TAOK.[14] The sole issue to be resolved is whether Michael was entitled to disability benefits for failure to perform his pre-injury duties as seaman for more than 120 days. Petitioners contend that the 120-day rule applied by the CA as basis for granting Michael’s permanent total disability benefits was already abandoned and no longer controlling. In support of their position, petitioners cited the cases of PHILASIA Shipping Agency Corporation, Inc. v. Tomacruz,[15] citing Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.(Vergara),[16] and Santiago v. Pacbasin Shipmanagement, Inc. (Pacbasin),[17] where it was clarified that the temporary total disability period of 120 days may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days. Thus, petitioners claim that the seafarer’s cause of action arises only after the lapse of a maximum 240-day period. Petitioners add that Michael’s failure to complete his medical treatment with Dr. Cruz prevented the latter from issuing a final assessment of his disability, and thus, caused him to lose his right to be entitled to disability compensation. Petitioners relied on the case of Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[18] where it was held that abandonment by a seafarer of his medical treatment with the company-designated physician resulted in the denial of his disability claim. There being no medical evidence to prove that he was suffering from disability, petitioners argued that Michael had no cause of action at the time he filed his complaint. Petitioners assert that the award of attorney’s fees was without basis. According to them, even if a claimant was compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his rights, attorney’s fees may still not be awarded in the absence of a clear showing of bad faith. Respondent’s Position In his Comment,[19] Michael counters that the 120-day period in Valenzona[20] applies to him. He asserts what determines a seafarer’s permanent disability is his inability to resume his customary work for a period of 120 days, notwithstanding any fit-to-work declaration or impediment rating issued by the company-designated physician, as has been fortified in the recent cases of Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Tanawan (Wallem Maritime Services),[21] and Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar (Kestrel Shipping).[22] Michael adds that petitioners’ reliance on the Vergara and Pacbasin cases, among others, was misplaced. elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/58642 4/12