vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him.
As enunciated by this Court in Viernes v. National Labor Relations
Commission, an employer is liable to pay indemnity in the form of nominal
damages to an employee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal,
the employer fails to comply with the requirements of due process. The Court,
after considering the circumstances therein, fixed the indemnity at P2,590.50,
which was equivalent to the employee’s one month salary. This indemnity is
intended not to penalize the employer but to vindicate or recognize the
employee’s right to statutory due process which was violated by the employer.
The violation of the petitioners’ right to statutory due process by the
private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal
damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing
circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We
believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future
violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it
provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter
under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
While it is no longer necessary to resolve the other issues presented in this
petition, still we opt to discuss them one by one.
Petitioner asserts that Anita filed her petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals out of time. According to petitioner, on the envelope containing the
assailed 3 February 1999 Resolution are annotations consisting of: (a) Atty.
Ciriaco S. Cruz, C. S. Cruz & Associates, Counsel for Complainant, 1801 Int. J. P.
Laurel St., San Miguel, Manila; (b) First Notice; (c) Second Notice; (d) Third
Notice; and (e) Return to Sender Unclaimed. Petitioner asserts that these
annotations reveal how, when, and to whom delivery of the mail was made.
Petitioner contends that since only the date of the second notice of the
postmaster – 23 February 1999 – is readable, it can be deduced from this that Atty.
Cruz constructively received the 3 February 1999 Resolution on 28 February 1999
or five days from 23 February 1999.