5/28/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly classification is simply misplaced. The approach, sadly, only unnecessarily shifted the burden to the government to prove: (1) a compelling state interest; and (2) that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended result. It also unnecessarily undermines the presumed constitutionality of statutes and of the respect that the Court accords to the acts of a co-equal branch. The differential or rational basis scrutiny, i.e., where the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest, would have undoubtedly served the purpose without bringing these unnecessary implications. As I maintain the same view and legal reasoning, and if only to emphasize my position in the present case, I quote below portions of my Concurring Opinion in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al. (Serrano Opinion)[4] rejecting the validity of using the strict scrutiny standard to test the validity of the subject clause under the equal protection guarantee. I invoke the same legal reasoning as basis, mutatis mutandis, of my stance in the present case. A suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the most invidious bases for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation, and to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation. With a suspect classification, the scrutiny of the classification is raised to its highest level: the ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and government carries the burden of proving that its challenged policy is constitutional. To withstand strict scrutiny, the government must show that its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest; if this is proven, the state must then demonstrate that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended result. In the present case, I do not see the slightest indication that Congress actually intended to classify OFWs – between and among themselves, and in relation with local workers – when it adopted the disputed portion of Section 10. The congressional intent was to merely grant recruitment and manning agencies an incentive and thereby encourage them into greater deployment efforts, although, as discussed above, the incentive really works for the foreign principals’ benefit at the expense of the OFWs. Even assuming that a classification resulted from the law, the classification should not immediately be characterized as a suspect classification that would invite the application of the strict scrutiny standard. The disputed portion of Section 10 does not, on its face, restrict or curtail the civil and human rights of any single group of OFWs. At best, the disputed portion limits the monetary award for wrongful termination of employment – a tort situation affecting an OFW’s economic interest. This characterization and the unintended classification that unwittingly results from the incentive scheme under Section 10, to my mind, render a strict scrutiny disproportionate to the circumstances to which it is applied. elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/57319 31/39