essentially disputed; who monitored the petitioners case during its progress; and who issued his certification on the basis of the medical records available and the results obtained. This led the NLRC in its own ruling to note that:   x x x more weight should be given to the assessment of degree of disability made by the company doctors because they were the ones who attended and treated petitioner Vergara for a period of almost five (5) months from the time of his repatriation to the Philippines on September 5, 2000 to the time of his declaration as fit to resume sea duties on January 31, 2001, and they were privy to petitioner Vergaras case from the very beginning, which enabled the company-designated doctors to acquire a detailed knowledge and familiarity with petitioner Vergaras medical condition which thus enabled them to reach a more accurate evaluation of the degree of any disability which petitioner Vergara might have sustained. These are not mere company doctors. These doctors are independent medical practitioners who passed the rigorous requirements of the employer and are more likely to protect the interest of the employer against fraud.   Moreover, as between those who had actually attended to petitioner Vergara throughout the duration of his illness and those who had merely examined him later upon his recovery for the purpose of determining disability benefits, the former must prevail.   We note, too, as the respondent company aptly observed, that the petitioner never raised the issue of the company-designated doctors competence at any level of the arbitration proceedings, only at this level of review. On the contrary, the petitioner accepted his assessment of fitness and in fact issued a certification to this effect. Under these circumstances, we find the NLRC and the CAs conclusions on the petitioners fitness to work, based on the assessment/certification by the company-designated physician, to be legally and factually in order. As a last point, the petitioner has repeatedly invoked our ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[41] apparently for its statement that the respondent in the case was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. This declaration of a permanent total disability after the initial 120 days of temporary total disability cannot, however, be simply lifted and applied as a general rule for all cases in all contexts. The specific context of the application should be considered, as we