:::.-·=r•='""""~~=<!.==-::____._. . '"'==·- . -~-··-==~,....._..,.===·===.:.·.===~=-==o:>===:d-==-=====~--~----==""" ~~-~=-~= The above mentioned factors however must not be the only factors in determining the annual consideration. 2. A period for renegotiation of the AVA which should start not earlier than three (3) years, or in case the primary crop is a perennial one, one (1) year, from the end of the term of the AVA. 3. That failure to renegotiate or agree to an extension shall result in the immediate and actual cessation of the relationship created under the AVA. 4. An express statement that both parties obligate themselves to uphold the provisions of the labor law and such rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto in the implementation of the AVA. 5. An express statement that both parties agree that any issue or dispute arising from the AVA, or such questions pertaining to its validity, shall be threshed out through a mediation/conciliation proceeding first before the filing of an action. 6. The AVA and the employment contracts of the investor with its employees (including ARB-owners who may be hired as a result of the AVA) shall be separate, distinct and independent from one another, such that the termination of the employment shall not affect the terms of the AVA, and, conversely, the expiration or termination of the AVA shall not cause the automatic termination of the employeremployee relationship between the employees and the investor. 7. In the case of AVAs involving lease of agricultural land, the terms and conditions pertaining to the improvements introduced by the investor over the land leased, such as, among others, the manner by which such improvements may be retained or removed at the termination of the lease and/or the manner of its valuation by such date. 8. Provision by the investor of a program for technology and farm management training for the ARBs. 9. The date of effectivity of the AVA must not be earlier that the date of its approval by the PARC or the Regional Director, as the case may be. 10. Furthermore, the AVA may not contain the following provisions: i. an automatic extension or re-enactment of the AVA; ii. unilateral take-over of the investor over the possession or management of the land; iii. non-payment of rentals on the ground of crop failure due to natural calamities and/or force majeur, in case of lease AVAs; and iv. transfer of ownership of the land. 11. Finally, the AVA may not contain any provision that is contrary to an agrarian or any other law. Prescinding from the above, it appears that the government has taken steps to regulate AVAs, but then the first regulation came late when DAR issued its Administrative Order No. 2 Series of 1999 only on October 01, 1999, several years after the effectivity of CARP. Such belated issuance came after DAR's conscious realization that the ARBs did not have capital to work on the fields they now owned. They do not have viable source of credit, forcing them to go to monopolistic creditors that charge high interest rates, and even leasing back the lands to their former landlords. Admittedly, there are other problems that emerged, prompting the government to develop new regulations seemingly to address them. During the 16th Congress (2013-2016), Cong. Teddy Brawner Baguilat, legislative representative of the lone district of Ifugao, among other lawmakers of the lower House of Philippine Legislature, filed House Bill No. 5161, titled "An Act Regulating the Establishment and Implementation of Agribusiness Venture Agreements (AVA) in Agrarian Lands. "42 The explanatory note appended on the bill cites the case of onerous contract on the agribusiness venture arrangement (AVA) between the Hijo Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (HARBCO) and Lapanday Foods, Inc. in Davao Oriental. We quote in part Cong. Baguilat's notes as follows: 42 Attached herewith as Annex "G" 21