Dissenting Opinion - 34 - G.R. No. 224469 hand, and the protection of scarce resources found within these lands, on the other. This is the clear import ofDENR-NCIP Joint AO No. 2008-01 as well as the ENIPAS Act and its IRR in mandating the State to consult with all interested IPs towards a holistic agreement that will institutionalize the traditional and culture-driven forest resources practices of the IPs. To me, both the State and the IPs can benefit from the present shift to a more decentralized form of management where participation and dialogue between and among all stakeholders is encouraged. . We must never lose sight of the fact that regulation by the State of our natural resources, most especially trees which take years to grow, is not a pointless exercise that is meant to thwart the rights ofIPs. On the contrary, it is specifically crafted to preserve such resources so that generations of Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, will have the chance to enjoy the same many, many years from now. While We acknowledged, in Maynilad, the State's rights over natural resources, We simultaneously introduced the Public Trust Doctrine which impresses upon States the correlative, affirmative duties of a trustee to manage natural resources for the benefit of the beneficiaries, the present and future generations. 97 Clearly, the passage of P.D. No. 705 serves as an actual, legitimate application by the State of the Public Trust Doctrine which not only asserts its rights over forest resources but also aims to preserve the same for the benefit of the People. For this reason, I do not share the view that the acquittal handed to the petitioners in this case is not a blanket exemption. No matter how one looks at it, the implication of the present majority opinion would be just that: a blanket exemption. For how, then, can the Court prevent all other IPs from invoking the doctrine of this case under the principle of stare decisis? In Cruz, Justice Kapunan, who seems to have foreseen the present scenario, explicitly emphasized that "the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. The utilization of said natural resources is always subject to compliance by the indigenous peoples with existing laws, ... since it is not they but the State, which owns these resources." 98 Neither can it be accurately concluded that an outright logging ban puts the lives of IPs at risk for their everyday lives are so intimately intertwined with the land and resources. The present case merely involves trees or timber that are cut without the requisite license under P.D. No. 705. It does not, however, cover those natural respur~es that are truly essential to the daily sustenance of these IPs. Even with the operation of P.D. No. 705, IPs are very much free to hunt forest animals, gather plants, and cultivate their lands within their domains with little to no governmental interference. But even if we assume that the cutting of timber is so indispensable to the 97 Va , Maynilad Water Services, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 53. " C=v. Seaetary ofEnv&onmenl andNatuml Re,ourw, ,upra note 49, at 1077.