Dissenting Opinion - 17 - G.R. No. 224469 private lands under Section 3(mm) of P.D. No. 705, ancestral domains and lands clearly fall under the category of private land. Nevertheless, Justice Caguioa insists that ancestral domains of IPs are a unique kind of property that are neither public nor private, ownership of which springs not from the State but by virtue of "native title." In support of his contention, he cites several legal bases. First, he alludes to the concept of "native title" that can be traced back to the 1909 case of Carino v. Insular Government47 where the United States Supreme Court upheld the IP claim of private ownership that "will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land." Then, he identifies Our ruling in Republic v. Cosalan 48 where We basically upheld the doctrine emuiciated in Carino. Finally, Justice Caguioa ends his conclusion by citing the Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary ofEnvironment and Natural Resources49 which discussed the view that ancestral domains are IPs' private but community property and that "it is private merely because it is not part of the public domain." Thus, on the basis thereof, Justice Caguioa concludes that since ancestral domains are neither public nor private, the cutting of timber and forest products thereon cannot be penalized under Section 77 of P.D. No. 705. Such interpretation, however, runs contrary to the very sources it aims to elucidate. A more circumspect reading of these sources indicates, simply, that ancestral domains and lands are not public lands. This must be the true and actual import of said authorities for they do not go on to deduce that said domains are not private lands. On the contrary, a more prudent analysis of the same strengthens the finding that ancestral domains are, in fact, private in character. In Cruz, former Chief Justice Puno expressly opined that ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain. 50 Even Justice 46 Section 3(mm) of P.D. No. 705 indirectly pertains to private land in stating that private right means or refers to titled rights of ownership under existing laws, and in the case of primitive tribes, to rights of possession existing at the time a license is granted under this Code, which possession may include places of abode and worship, burial grounds, and old clearings, but excludes production forest inclusive of logged-over areas, commercial forests and established plantations of forest trees and trees of economic value. 47 41 Phil. 935, 944 (1907). 48 G.R. No. 216999, July 4, 2018. Third Division, penned by Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, with Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, and then Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Lucas P. Bersamin, Samuel R. Martires concurring. 49 400 Phil. 904, 995 (2000). 5 ° Former Chief Justice Puno stated in Cruz: Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. XXX t°ZY Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence ofprivate ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domain,. The IPRA categorically dcchues ru,ccstral lands and domains held by native title as ncvcc