Dissenting Opinion - 15 - G.R. No. 224469 are strictly in adherence to established traditional leadership structure and practices. Unlike the majority's assertions, therefore, the case before Us does not have to be one where a statute such as the IPRA is given preferred application at the expense of P.D. No. 705 especially since reconciliation is achievable to give force and effect to both. The DENR-NCIP Joint AO No. 2008-01 duly accomplishes. this end. It bears stressing that nowhere in P.D. No. 705 was it provided that IPs are absolutely prohibited from cutting any and all trees found within ancestral domains. The law merely requires them to obtain the necessary permit prior to the cutting. In tum, nowhere in the IPRA was it declared that IPs shall enjoy an unbridled right to log subject to no limitation under existing laws. It can hardly be said, therefore, that the requirements imposed by P.D. No. 705 are contrary to the objectives of the IPRA in the recognition of IPs rights. On the contrary, the two are actually complementary of each other. In Lim v. Gamosa, 38 for instance, We refrained from declaring that the IPRA must prevail over Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.) 129 in the absence of an unequivocal expression of the will of the Congress. There, We held that there is no clear, irreconcilable conflict between the IPRA, which merely granted the NCIP jurisdiction over all claims of IPs without restricting words such as "primary" or "exclusive," and B.P. 129 which granted RTCs exclusive, original jurisdiction over similar IP claims. Well settled is the rule that implied repeals are often disfavoured. As much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature for otherwise, laws will always remain doubtful. 39 It must be noted, too, that interpreting the meaning of "authority" in such a way that excludes IPs from the coverage of Section 77 is tantamount to judicial legislation. This is because there simply is no legislative intent to that effect. In Corpuz v. People, 40 the Court was si1nilarly faced with a question of the continued validity of the penalties imposed by the RPC on crimes against property pegged at values during the time of its enactment in 1930. We, however, refrained from modifying this range, for to do so would be to commit judicial legislation. Thus, apart from the recognition that the Court is ill-equipped and lacks the resources to arrive at a more accurate assessment of the IP rights -vis-a-vis natural resources, We should not usurp Congress' inherent powers of enacting laws. 41 38 {7 774Phil. 31 (2015). Penera v. Commission on Elections, 615 Phil. 667, 718 (2009); and De Lima v. Guerrero, 819 Phil. 616, 1211 (2017). 40 734 Phil. 353 (2014). 41 Id. at 425. 39