04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly test of its jurisdiction in such cases: [J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily. That is why Art. VII, §18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, who chaired the Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, was the author of the opinions of the Court in Lopez v. Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia. Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting in this case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face. The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on freedom of expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far inseparable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not possible. For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is not only to act without jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in adjudicating abstract or hypothetical questions, its decision will be based on speculation rather than experience. Deprived of the opportunity to observe the impact of the law, the Court is likely to equate questions of constitutionality with questions of wisdom and is thus likely to intrude into the domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it cannot be too often repeated, cannot take place in a vacuum. Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional issues raised by petitioners will be a "galling cop out"[4] or an "advocacy of timidity, let alone isolationism."[5] To decline the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is no more a "cop out" or a sign of "timidity" than it was for Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison[6] to hold that petitioner had the right to the issuance of his commission as justice of the peace of the District of Columbia only to declare in the end that after all mandamus did not lie, because §13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/36882 131/148