04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day administration or all those pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the discretion of the Chairperson of the Commission, as the Chief Executive Officer. Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control of the President over the NCIP by characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President as "lateral but autonomous...for purposes of policy and program coordination." Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules characterize the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President, such characterization does not remove said body from the President's control and supervision. The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well being of the indigenous peoples and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto.[182] It has been granted administrative,[183] quasi-legislative[184] and quasi-judicial powers[185] to carry out its mandate. The diverse nature of the NCIP's functions renders it impossible to place said agency entirely under the control of only one branch of government and this, apparently, is the reason for its characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An "independent agency" is defined as an administrative body independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a superior head of department, as distinguished from a "subordinate agency" or an administrative body whose action is subject to administrative review or revision.[186] That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals,[187] like those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress "under the office of the President" and, as such, is still subject to the President's power of control and supervision granted under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution[188] with respect to its performance of administrative functions, such as the following: (1) the NCIP must secure the President's approval in obtaining loans to finance its projects; [189] (2) it must obtain the President's approval for any negotiation for funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in whatever from and from whatever source;[190] (3) the NCIP shall submit annual reports of its operations and achievements to the President, and advise the latter on all matters relating to the indigenous peoples;[191] and (4) it shall exercise such other powers as may be directed by the President.[192] The President is also given the power to appoint the Commissioners of the NCIP[193] as well as to remove them from office for cause motu proprio or upon the recommendation of any indigenous community.[194] To recapitulate: (1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (b), 5, 6, elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/36882 107/148