1/4/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly construction. Respondent proposes that the regulations must be harmonized with Section 261(k) of BP 881, which reads: Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense: xxxx (k) Unlawful electioneering. - It is unlawful to solicit votes or undertake any propaganda on the day of registration before the board of election inspectors and on the day of election, for or against any candidate or any political party within the polling place and with a radius of thirty meters thereof. Accordingly, respondent insists that the prohibition under Section 36.8 of RA 9189, as amended by RA 10590, and Section 74(II)(8) of Comelec Resolution No. 10035 shall be taken to mean that it is confined to the polling places and to a radius of 30 meters. Respondent also proposes that We look into the intent of Congress to limit the prohibition on campaigning abroad during the 30-day voting period to candidates. Respondent cites the sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino Pimentel III for Senate Bill No. 3312, where he said that one of the changes agreed upon was to introduce a proviso making it an election offense for candidates to campaign in the country they are visiting within the 30-day voting period for overseas voting.[40] Respondent's arguments are flawed. Indeed, the touchstone of statutory interpretation is the probable intent of the legislature. When interpreting a statute, We must ascertain legislative intent so as to effectuate the purpose of a particular law. But the first step in determining that intent is to scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and common-sense meaning. When the words are clear and unambiguous, there is no need for statutory construction or resort to other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history. [41] The language of Section 36.8 of RA 9189, as amended by RA 10590, and Section 74(II) (8) of Comelec Resolution No. 10035 is clear and unambiguous. If Congress "truly intended the interpretations suggested by respondent, it could have easily identified the exact place where the prohibition applies and to whom the prohibition is addressed. As the regulations plainly read, however, they prohibit any person (and not just the candidates) from engaging in partisan political activities without any qualification as to the location where these activities are conducted. Courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.[42] When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then judicial inquiry is complete.[43] I cannot subscribe to the proposition of respondent that the legislative history of RA 9189, as amended by RA 10590, points to a different result. Judicial inquiry into the reach of Section 36.8 begins and ends with what Section 36.8 does say and with what it does not.[44] https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/65669 55/60