Decision 17 G.R. No. 221139 the public prosecutor, "direct[s] and control[s] the prosecution of [an] offense." 71 As such, a public prosecutor is: [T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he [or she] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. 72 The capacity to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of the State's police power. 73 It inheres in "the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights. " 74 The basic precepts underlying crimes and criminal actions make it improper for the State to yield "disputes" involving criminal offenses to indigenous peoples' customary laws and practices. To yield criminal prosecution would be to disregard the State and the Filipino people as the objects of criminal offenses. The application of customary laws may enable a measure of reparation for private injuries engendered by criminal offenses, but it will never enable the consummate recompense owed to the State and the Filipino people. Ultimately then, yielding prosecution would mean sanctioning a miscan-iage of justice. It was never the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's intent to facilitate such miscan-iage of justice. Its view of self-governance and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that balances. Preservation is pursued in the context of national unity and is impelled by harmony with the national legal system. Customary laws cannot work to undermine penal statutes designed to address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty. Viewed through the lens of the requisites for issuing a writ of mandamus, there is no right or duty to even speak of here. Nowhere in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does it state that courts of law are to abandon jurisdiction over criminal proceedings in favor of mechanisms applying customary laws. 71 72 73 74 Baviera v. Paglinawan, 544 Phil. 107, 119 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, First Division] citing Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, 165 Phil. 288 (l 976) [Per J. Antonio, Second Division]. Suarez v. Platon, 69 Phil. 556, 564-565 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc:] citing 69 United States Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309. See People v. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120 (1922) [Per J. Romuladez, En Banc]. U.S. v. Pablo, 35 Phil. 94, 100 (1916) [Per J. Torres, Second Division]. ;J A'