“Stated differently, save for the recognized exception, an employee cannot pursue both remedies simultaneously but has the option to proceed by interposing one remedy and waiving his right over the other. As we have explained in Floresca, this doctrinal rule is rooted on the theory that the basis of the compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is separate and distinct from the award of damages under the Civil Code, thus: “The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). “Compensation is given to mitigate harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 D.J.S. 36). “In other words, under compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo v. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).” “The principle underscored in the case of Floresca was further affirmed in the later case of Ysmael Maritime Corporation v. Avelino, wherein we emphasized that once the claimant had already exercised his choice to pursue his right under one remedy, he is barred from proceeding with an alternative remedy. As eloquently laid down by Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan: “It is therefore clear that respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second option. ‘Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, (he) is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission.’ “In the case at bar, Florentina was forced to institute a civil suit for indemnity under the New Civil Code, after Candano Shipping refused to compensate her husband’s death. 56