The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the above-quoted
telefax message, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign
“principal” (sic) and therefore was aware of and had consented to the execution of
the extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does not provide evidence
that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the expiration on
February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the
Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Divina’s allegedly withheld savings
does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract. As
Sunace points out in its Reply filed before the Court of Appeals,
[20]
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an
information given to the petitioner that the private respondent had t[aken]
already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction was
made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or the
petitioner’s consent thereto.
[21]
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is
safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by
Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a
mandatory conference following Divina’s filing of the complaint on February 14,
2000.
Respecting the Court of Appeals following dictum:
As agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of
such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending [Divina’s]
employment contract necessarily bound it,
[22]
it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent,
Sunace, to the principal, employer Xiong, not the other way around. The
knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its
agent Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be
bound under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be
[23]