CEDAW/C/GC/29 public order, prevent the abuse of unequal bargaining power and protect each spouse from abuse of power in making such contracts. These protective measures may include requiring that such agreements be written or subject to other formal requirements and providing for retroactive invalidation or for financial or other remedies if the contract is found to be abusive. VI. Economic aspects during the relationship 36. A number of States parties retain discriminatory systems of property management during the marriage. Some retain laws stating that the man is the head of the household, thus giving him the role of sole economic agent as well. 37. Where a community property regime is the norm, nominally providing that half of the marital property is theirs, women still may not have the right to manage the property. In many legal systems, women may retain the right to manage property that they own individually and may accumulate and manage additional separate property during the marriage. However, property accumulated by virtue of women’s economic activity may be considered as belonging to the marital household, and women may not have a recognized right to manage it. This may be the case even with regard to women’s own wages. 38. States parties should provide for equal access by both spouses to the marital property and equal legal capacity to manage it. They should ensure that the right of women to own, acquire, manage, administer and enjoy separate or non-marital property is equal to that of men. VII. Economic and financial consequences upon dissolution of relationships Grounds for divorce and financial consequences 39. Some legal systems make a direct link between grounds for divorce and the financial consequences of divorce. Fault-based divorce regimes may condition financial rights on the lack of fault. They may be abused by husbands to eliminate any financial obligation towards their wives. In many legal systems, no financial support is awarded to wives against whom a fault-based divorce has been pronounced. Fault-based divorce regimes may include different standards of fault for wives and husbands, such as requiring proof of greater infidelity by a husband than by a wife as a basis for divorce. Fault-based economic frameworks frequently work to the detriment of the wife, who is usually the financially dependent spouse. 40. States parties should: • Revise provisions linking grounds for divorce and financial consequences in order to eliminate opportunities for husbands to abuse these provisions and thereby to avoid any financial obligations towards their wives. • Revise provisions relating to fault-based divorce in order to provide compensation for the contributions made by the wife to the family’s economic well-being during the marriage. • Eliminate differences in the standards of fault for wives and for husbands, such as requiring proof of greater infidelity by a husband than by a wife as a basis for divorce. 41. Some legal regimes require the wife or her family to return to the husband or his family any economic benefits in the form of payment or preferment, or other such payments 7