Because of this, an unscheduled bunkering operation in Oslo had to be done, contrary to instructions. 3.1.d. As part of the safety procedures in the Vessel, it is necessary that all items of safety equipment be tested every week and a report entered in the engine room logbook. [Private respondent] was instructed and under duty to test the engine room fire alarms by activating each one individually with a heat or smoke source depending on its type. It was, however, discovered later that [private respondent] miserably failed to do this xxx. 3.1.e. [Private respondent] as [c]hief [e]ngineer miserably failed to instill discipline among the engine room personnel who are under his direct supervision, causing unrest among them and lack of respect for him and resulting in the disruption of the smooth operations of the Vessel. 3.2. Contrary to [private respondents] allegations, he was given fair warning and enough opportunity to explain his side in the foregoing incidents, not to mention all the chances given to him to improve his substandard work performance before he was dismissed. Because of his gross negligence and his failure to perform the duties for which he was hired, [petitioners] had no other choice than to terminate his services for cause pursuant to managements prerogative to terminate an employee because of gross and habitual neglectof his duties (Article 283, Labor Code). Private respondent rebutted these allegations in his position paper, stating: (1) it would be childish for an experienced chief engineer to close the operating air valve to the bridge; a low level of starting air is caused by excessive and continuous use thereof during maneuvering, and such malfunction is due to the pilots error; (2) the loss of main water pressure due to the formation of ice on the suction strainer occurred because the sea water inlet was clogged; private respondent, who was at the engine room, contacted the master of the vessel, who was then asleep, to stop the engine and change the sea valve to activate the sea water pressure; during the same incident, it was also found that the other valve did not fully open by remote control; (3) private respondent denied that the fuel figures reached only five tons as demonstrated by the low-level alarm which, while set at ten cubic meters, did not set off even until the next bunkering of the ship; it was Peter Robinson, the ship superintendent, who panicked and caused the unscheduled bunkering operation in Oslo; (4) private respondent conducted safety equipment-testing religiously, but admitted that in one instance he did not test the equipment with a heat or smoke source, upon Robinsons advice that the alarm would upset the pilot and the crew who were then resting; (5) private respondent denied that there was unrest among the engine personnel, averring that on the contrary, they cooperated and signed the guidelines which the former issued to them; and (6) he denied having been given a chance to explain his side regarding the mentioned incidents, the truth being that he was surprised when he was told of his dismissal.iii[3] Petitioners filed their position paper and supporting documents which however failed to rebut private respondents allegations.iv[4]