4/29/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly illness; (b) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death; and (c) the death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis to support otherwise. Absent any semblance of causation, it cannot be inferred that the death of Armando after the term of his contract is compensable, if the inference is based solely on the circumstance that he was confined within two days and died within six months after his repatriation. Since the CA grounded its ruling mainly on this factor, this Court resolves against the grant of death benefits to respondent. Our Conclusion: The Benefits Due to Respondent In summary, the NLRC and the CA were excessively fixated on the proximity of the time between the repatriation and the death of the seafarer to automatically conclude that he contracted a fatal illness during his service. The CA even stressed in its ruling that it was safe to make that presumption. This approach to case disposition by the CA – making factual findings based only on presumptions,[46] and absent the quantum of evidence required in labor cases[47] – is an erroneous application of the law on compensation proceedings. As we have ruled in Gabunas, Sr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.,[48] citing Government Service Insurance System v. Cuntapay,[49] claimants in compensation proceedings must show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs.[50] Thus, since the CA crafted a legal conclusion out of conjectures and without substantial evidence, we rule that a reversible error of law attended its award of death benefits, minor child’s allowance, and burial expenses. For this reason, we delete the grant thereof to respondent. Notably, in resolving a special civil action for certiorari, the CA was only reviewing whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the aforementioned benefits to respondent.[51] Given that there were ample grounds to deny her claims based on Section 20( A) of the POEA Contract and on the deatih of evidence of causality, the CA should have sustained the NLRC's denial of her claims for death benefits, minor child's allowance, and burial expenses. In the course of resolving the propriety of awarding death benefits, minor child's allowance, and burial expenses under Section 20(A) of the POEA Contract, this Court inevitably finds that grave abuse of discretion also attended the NLRC's grant of medicine and hospitalization expenses and sickness allowance under Section 20(B) of the POEA Contract, moral damages, and attorney's fees to respondent. Specifically, we find that the labor court failed to establish in the first place that, during the term of his contract, Armando contracted an illness that was work related. Nevertheless, since its findings albeit unsubstantiated-were no longer appealed, we no longer address the same. WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104593 elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/56149 9/13