4/29/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly compensation for the death of the seafarer occurring after the termination of the employment contract on account of a work-related illness. But, for death under this provision to be compensable, the claimant must fulfill the following: 1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks describe herein; 2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; 3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; 4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. In fulfilling these requisites, respondent must present no less than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It must reach the level of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.[32] Given these parameters, the CA was expected to weigh substantial pieces of evidence proving that Armando’s death was compensable because (1) he was ill during the term of his contract; (2) his illness was work- related, as his work involves considerable exposure to the risks of contracting his illness; and (3) his contracted illness caused his death. Unfortunately, the CA failed to establish its factual basis for awarding respondent her death benefits claim. Firstly, as admitted by respondent, there was no documentation or account of any illness contracted by Armando aboard M/V Magellan. In fact, the NLRC and the CA acknowledged in their rulings this gap in the records as discussed above. Without any record of illness during his voyage, it is thus difficult to say that he acquired or developed lung cancer during his service. Notwithstanding the lack of evidence, the CA resorted to inference. It made much about the circumstances that Armando was initially declared fit to work, and that he was then confined within two days after his disembarkation. Based on these facts, it inferred that his lung cancer was contracted during his service because that illness “does not just develop in one day, or much less, deteriorate that fast.”[33] In so ruling, the CA analogously applied our pronouncement in Wallem v. Maritime Services, Inc.[34] In that case, we granted death compensation to the beneficiaries of the deceased seafarer who was also confined two days after his repatriation. However, Wallem does not apply to the case of Armando. Apart from the time element between his confinement and repatriation, other special considerations distinguish these two cases. In Wallem, the seafarer’s deteriorating state of health at the time he disembarked was established not only by the proximity of his confinement to his repatriation, but also by the fact that his employment contract was preterminated by “mutual consent.” The courts in that case have consistently interpreted such mutually elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/56149 7/13