partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter’s employment. In German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC,31[31] the Court’s discussion on the seafarer’s claim for disability benefits is enlightening. Thus: [In] order to claim disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the “company-designated” physician who must proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter’s employment. There is no provision requiring accreditation by the POEA of such physician. In fact, aside from their own gratuitous allegations, petitioners are unable to cite a single provision in the said contract in support of their assertions or to offer any credible evidence to substantiate their claim. If accreditation of the company-designated physician was contemplated by the POEA, it would have expressly provided for such a qualification, by specifically using the term “accreditation” in the Standard Employment Contract, to denote its intention. For instance, under the Labor Code, it is expressly provided that physicians and hospitals providing medical care to an injured or sick employee covered by the Social Security System or the Government Service Insurance System must be accredited by the Employees Compensation Commission. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. There is no ambiguity in the wording of the Standard Employment Contract – the only qualification prescribed for the physician entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s disability is that he be ‘company-designated.’ When the language of the contract is explicit, as in the case at bar, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters thereof, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import. [Emphasis supplied]   In this case, the findings of respondents’ designated physician that petitioner has been suffering from brief psychotic disorder and that it is not work-related must be respected.   The Court commiserates with the petitioner, but absent substantial evidence from which reasonable basis for the grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, the 31[31] G.R. No. 142049, 403 Phil. 572, 588-589 (2001).