to a third person with a right recognized by law.xv[15] Although some of the requisites mentioned were satisfied, it cannot be said that the quitclaim executed by Homicillada was a fairly reasonable settlement of his claims. He was shortchanged by a not so insignificant amount. The financial terms were so unconscionable that we have no hesitance to strike down the Receipt and Release dated 16 August 1994 as a complete nullity.xvi[16] Petitioners likewise aver that Homicilladas illness was diagnosed as chronic low back pain in the medical report of Dr. Mario Ver of the St. Lukes Orthopedic Institute.xvii[17] Citing Blacks Law dictionary which defines chronic as (w)ith reference to diseases, of long duration, or characterized by slow progressive symptoms; deep seated and obstinate, or threatening a long continuance; -distinguished from acute,xviii[18] petitioners submit that the use of the word chronic as characterizing Homicilladas malady supports their position that the same was not work-related but already pre-existing long before his overseas employment with petitioners. Petitioners reliance on Blacks Law Dictionary is misplaced. Its definition of chronic does not state a definite span of time to qualify the duration of the existence of the illness as chronic. As aptly observed by the NLRC, the definition does not discount the fact that a period of more than five (5) months from the time Homicillada started to work for petitioners until such finding of chronic low back pain on 15 July 1994 may be considered long enough to describe his ailment as chronic since it could have traced its inception to the date of his actual employment. But even assuming that the ailment of Homicillada was contracted prior to his employment with the MV Rhine, this fact would not exculpate petitioners from liability. Compensability of an ailment does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of the employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition. It is indeed safe to pressume that, at the very least, the arduous nature of Homicilladas employment had contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was pre-existing at the time of his employment. Therefore, it is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in order for an employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he received the injury, or that he be free from disease. Every workman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them, and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of his death or disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had for injury independent of any pre-existing weakness or disease. In the instant case, the Court is more inclined to believe the findings of the POEA, which are supported by substantial evidence: The contention of respondent (herein petitioners) that the sickness of the complainant (herein private respondent) was pre-existing and was concealed from the respondent is untenable. The fact is before the complainant was made to sign the contract, he was required to undergo medical examination and declared fit to work otherwise the respondent would not have accomodated him. The respondent cannot avoid liability by saying that complainants sickness was concealed from it. Being an employer, respondent had all the opportunity to pre-qualify, screen and choose their