economic, social, and cultural rights were adopted ultra vires. There are at least three counter arguments to this assertion:12 i. ii. iii. II. The Commission has the power to determine whether the Petition raises claims that fall within its remit as discussed in section II below. As noted elsewhere, most if not all of the economic, social, and cultural rights violations invoked by the Petitioners can be linked back to civil and political rights, 13 specifically the right to life – also invoked in the Petition – and the right to property. 14 The Commission’s jurisdiction to adopt its Omnibus Rules of Procedure has not been the subject of domestic legal challenge. Accordingly, the Omnibus Rules in their current form are demonstrably intra vires as a matter of the law of the Philippines for the purposes of the current inquiry. 15 The Commission has the competence to determine whether the claims raised in the Petition fall within its own remit The Commission has the power to interpret the scope of its mandate within the boundaries set by the Philippines Constitution, article VIII, section 18.2. Furthermore, APF and GANHRI note how the well-established doctrine of compétence de la competence enables the Commission to ascertain its own jurisdiction and further note that this doctrine is well established both in domestic and international law. 16 III. The Commission has authority to investigate violations of all the rights mentioned in the Petition The Petition invokes civil and political rights enshrined in the Constitition, the Omnibus Rules, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 17 ELAW’s brief 12 Amicus curiae brief submitted by APF & GANHRI, ¶ 4, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/media/resource_file/APF_Paper_Amicus_Brief_HR_Climate_Change.pdf [hereinafter APF & GANHRI brief]. 13 Extensive domestic, regional, and international practice on the mutual recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights, and civil and political rights exists. The linking has been employed to protect economic, social, and cultural rights when the domestic legislative framework does not permit their direct judicial enforcement, for example, in cases where they are enshrined in the constitution as aspirational goals. At the international level, this practice has been traditionally utilized to remedy the lack of complaint procedures for economic, social, and cultural rights violations, or when a human rights treaty did not include specific economic, social, and cultural rights. In particular, the right to life and the right to property have become “intersectional” devices for the protection of numerous economic, social, and cultural rights, including the rights to health, to food, to water, to housing (and specifically the prohibition of forced eviction), to education, and to social security, and indigenous peoples’ right to land. The practice is substantial in quantity and universal in coverage. See APF & GANHRI brief, at ¶ 4 (for references to case law and commentaries on this). 14 The APF & GANHRI brief explains that while the Petitioners have not alleged violations of the constitutional right to property resulting from climate change impacts, the Commission’s mandate affords it the option to sua sponte consider violations of this right alone and in conjunction with other rights. See id. at ¶ 4. 15 See id. at ¶ 6. 16 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (ICTY Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm. See APF & GANHRI brief, at ¶ 4. 17 See amicus curiae brief submitted by Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (ELAW), at p. 6, https://businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/ELaw.pdf [hereinafter ELAW brief]. 13