What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employeeemployer relations.9[9] More recently in De Guzman. vs. Court of Appeals,10[10] where the money claim was based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held: "...The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to 'money claims specifically recoverable under said Code' but covers all money claims arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). ... It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that 'where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should prevail.' (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant."11[11] In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed. "In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed." Manuel L. Quezon University Association v. Manuel L. Quezon Educational Institution Inc., 172 SCRA 597, 604 (1989), citing De Joya v. Lantin, 19 SCRA 893 (1967); Lagman v. City of Manila, 17 SCRA 579 (1966); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines v. Guanzon, 172 SCRA 571, 575 (1967); Barcenas v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 498, 503 (1990); Central Negros Electric Cooperative Inc., v. NLRC, 236 SCRA 108, 114 (1994). 9[9] 10[10] 297 SCRA 743 (1998). 11[11] Id. At 750-751 (1998).