4/9/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[24] In this case, Taok failed to demonstrate that the NLRC’s dismissal of his complaint was attended with grave abuse of discretion or that the NLRC had no jurisdiction to order the same. On the contrary, the dismissal was warranted since at the time Taok filed his complaint against the petitioners, he had no cause of action against them. When Taok filed his complaint on September 19, 2006, the 120-day period for him to be considered in legal contemplation as totally and permanently disabled under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code had not yet lapsed. It was on July 27, 2006 that he was brought to Prince Rupert Medical Hospital for medical attention. If this would be considered as his first day of disability pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule X of the AREC or the day he signed-off from the vessel based on Paragraph 3, Section 20-B of the POEASEC, only 55 days had elapsed. The importance of this 120-day period cannot be overemphasized that the CA’s failure to consider and apply it in the disposition of this case strikes this Court as absurd. In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.,[25] this Court discussed the significance of the 120-day period as one when the seafarer is considered to be totally yet temporarily disabled, thus, entitling him to sickness wages. This is also the period given to the employer to determine whether the seafarer is fit for sea duty or permanently disabled and the degree of such disability. It is also in Vergara that this Court addressed the apparent conflict between Paragraph 3, Section 20 of the POEA-SEC on the one hand and Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code and Section 2, Rule X of the AREC. While it may appear under Paragraph 3, Section 20 of the POEA-SEC and Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code that the 120-day period is non- extendible and the lapse thereof without the employer making any declaration would be enough to consider the employee permanently disabled, interpreting them in harmony with Section 2, Rule X of the AREC indicates otherwise. That if the employer’s failure to make a declaration on the fitness or disability of the seafarer is because of the latter’s need for further medical attention, the period of temporary and total disability may be extended to a maximum of 240 days. Within such period, the seafarer is entitled to sickness wages. In Vergara, this Court stated: As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended to a maximum of elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/55036 11/15