04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments. xxxx Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered, especially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to mass ad interim appointments (three-hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation and if any circumstances justify revocation, those described herein should fit the exception. Incidentally, it should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after the appointee has qualified is the latter's equitable rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be successfully set up in the present situation, considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and other happenings detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief. The appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the stratagem to beat the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity and efficiency of the public service. Needless to say, there are instances wherein not only strict legality, but also fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken into account. In effect, the Court upheld the incoming President’s order revoking the en masse appointments made by the outgoing President. The Court accomplished this, not on the basis of any express constitutional or statutory prohibition against those appointments, but because the outgoing President “abused” the presidential power of appointment. The presence of “abuse” was found based on the circumstances attendant to Aytona’s appointment. After the Aytona ruling, cases on “midnight” or “last minute” appointments were ruled to be valid or invalid depending on the attendant circumstances. In Rodriguez, Jr. v. Quirino,[88] the Court nullified the appointment made after considering the following circumstances: the appointee was notified of his appointment only on December 30, 1961 (after the new President had assumed office) even though the appointment was made six months earlier; he took his oath of office days after the new President had recalled the “midnight” appointments issued by his predecessor; there was no urgency that justified the issuance of an ad interim appointment; and the oath of office that the appointee took was considered void. In contrast, the Court upheld the appointments made in Merrera v. Hon. Liwag[89] and Morales, Jr. v. Patriarca.[90] Gilera v. Fernandez[91] and Quimsing v. Tajanglangit[92] gave the Court the opportunity to clarify that the Aytona ruling and the subsequent cases “did not categorically declare [the revocation of the ‘midnight appointments’ as] valid” and elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/60717 43/75