04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly made by the outgoing local chief executive because it was made in disregard of civil service laws and rules, not because of an express prohibition against appointment per se. In reading these cited cases, it should be noted that their reference to the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII was tangential and pertained merely to the provision’s underlying rationale. Thus, while noting that this provision applies only to presidential appointments,[106] the Court nevertheless cited the prohibition because of the rationale behind it, i.e., to discourage losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes, as these losers thereby deprive the incoming administration of the opportunity to make their own appointments.[107] The CSC–issued prohibition applicable to local chief executives is jurisprudentially significant since the Constitution does not expressly prohibit an outgoing local chief executive from exercising its power to appoint or hire new employees after the elections (in the manner that an outgoing President is prohibited under Section 15, Article VII). Thus, the validity of an appointment by a local chief executive in the cited cases was, in effect, determined by applying the CSC’s regulations to the facts surrounding each contested appointment. This is the import of Sales and Nazareno. These cases, of course, are obviously inapplicable to the present case, given the existence of a clear constitutional prohibition applicable to an outgoing President. In this light, I also do not see any need to refer anything to the Office of the President with respect to the nature, character, and merits of the petitioners’ appointment. As previously stated, if an “appointment” is made within the prohibited period, it is illegal (as the CA itself found, although for the wrong reason as will be discussed later) for being contrary to the fundamental law. No amount of evaluation by the President can validate this kind of appointment. D. The meaning of appointment under Section 15, Article VII a. Considerations under Section 15, Article VII i. The Dichotomy of an Appointment – it is both an executive act and a process Appointments by the President may be construed both in its broad and narrow senses. In its broad sense, an appointment is a process that must comply with the requirements set by law and by jurisprudence in order to be complete. Narrowly speaking, an appointment is an executive act that the President unequivocally exercises pursuant to his discretion. This dichotomy arises because of the two participants in the appointing process — the appointing power (which, in this case, is the President), and the appointee. While the concurrence of the actions of these two participants is necessary in order for an appointment to be fully effective, it is also important to note that the appointing power and the appointee act independently of each other. An examination and understanding of this relationship is the key to the proper appreciation and interpretation of the “appointment” that Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of. elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/60717 46/75