prevailing “law of the case” as embodied in the final and executory July 30, 1999 NLRC Decision.   The foregoing arguments of OSCI are tenuous at best.   Doctrine of res judicata inapplicable   We agree with OSCI that the CA committed double faux pas by (1) ruling on the remand of the case by the NLRC to the Labor Arbiter which was not the subject of Bastol’s appeal before it; and (2) reinstating the January 28, 1999 Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr. which had earlier been set aside and was not the object of OSCI’s appeal to the NLRC. But these lapses do not adversely affect the CA’s determination of the propriety of the disability indemnity awarded to Bastol, as will be discussed here. Suffice it to say that the July 30, 1999 NLRC Decision cannot and does not constitute res judicata to the instant case. In Estate of the Late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio v. Dizon,51[51] extensively quoting from the earlier case of Vda. de Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr.,52[52] we explained the nature of res judicata, as now embodied in Sec. 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in its two concepts of “bar by former judgment” and “conclusiveness of judgment.” These concepts of the 51[51] G.R. No. 148777, October 18, 2007, 536 SCRA 565. 52[52] G.R. Nos. 75109-10, June 28, 1989, 174 SCRA 330.