Ruizo 33 with taking other factors into consideration may be arguably seen as a clear reflection of how its drafters were writing not only as legislators, but more evidently as representatives of the belief-system that they have. Consequently, this may lead to conflicts in the law where a legislator may have been producing laws that serve the interest of the ruling class to which that legislator belongs, to the (deliberate or unintentional) disadvantage of the non-represented, non-ruling class. The second portion of the law which I would like to look at more closely is the decidedly contentious provision under section 17 entitled “Women’s Right to Health” where paragraph (a) on Comprehensive Health Services states that, The State shall, at all times, provide for comprehensive, culture-sensitive and gender responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman’s life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women’s mortality and morbidity. Provided, that in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women’s religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances. Access to the following services shall be ensured: Xxx Xxx (3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe and effective methods of family planning (“LawPhil Project: Philippine Laws and Jurisprudence Databank”) (Italics supplied). ---- The above quoted portion of the law is litigious on two points: first, its qualifying statement stating that the comprehensive health care services for women will halt as soon as it begins to threaten the sacredness of the woman’s religious convictions, and secondly, the insertion of the word “ethical” as one of the descriptions of the kind of methods of family planning that are mandated under this law. Women advocates are arguing that the inclusion of those statements significantly weakens the potency of the law, and actually allows for wide elbowroom within which the women may, for one religious/ethical reason or another, be deprived of the services which this law precisely seeks to provide to all women. Via the statutory construction principle that in order to interpret a clause, one must look at the context wherein such clause was found, the word “ethical” in this particular context may be argued as that