34 A Preliminary Diction Study which reflects religious normative sentiments and valuations (as the word “religious” has been repeatedly mentioned in its preceding paragraphs). This provision would, in an ideally neutral and legally pluralistic setting, be harmless. On the contrary, in the Philippine setting where a Statedetermined legal centrism is the status quo, the religious sentiments of the majority of the population has a very real tendency of being considered as the main basis of the ethical standards, which fails to take into account the normative heterogeneity attendant upon the fact that social action always takes place in a context of multiple, overlapping semi-autonomous social fields. This danger easily disenfranchises religious, cultural and other indigenous groups, belonging to the minority, that might not share the doctrines of the more popular religion. Paragraph (a)(4) of the same section declares that the law shall ensure “Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of the parents to educate their children.” The clause there which states the primary right of the parents to rear their children the way they want to is supposed to be the exception to the general rule that sexuality education should be administered to the youth. However, when applied in an actual scenario where a parent can always opt out of the general rule, the exception may actually be so broadly and vaguely drafted that it can easily overpower the general rule. This is the fear of the women’s rights advocates: that all the rights that they have lobbied to be included in the then bill, would just be weakened or easily disregarded because of the catch-all exception that it will not go against religious or ethical convictions of people. Qualifications also form part of the structuring of legislative statements. Without qualifications in the legislative provision, the latter will be taken to be of universal application, and it is very rare that a rule of law is of universal application. However, there may be cases, one of which shall be pointed out in the latter discussion, of how attached qualifying clauses make the whole provision extremely narrow and restricted, so as to possibly negative the main point of the legislation to begin with. Which brings us to the next observed point in the Magna Carta of Women: the ethical qualification. Advocates have also questioned the inclusion of the word “ethical” to describe the kind of family planning methods that this law ensures. The challenge to the inclusion is not so much in the idea of not wanting the birth control methods to be ethical, but in the more critical question of whose ethical standards the term “ethical” in this provision is to be based. The term ethical may be generally and loosely defined as “morally right”, but that would also already beg the question of the shades and grays of morality. For example, for certain members of