5/28/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly [139] See also C. A. Azucena, Jr., Everyone’s LABOR CODE 29 (5th ed., 2007). [140] Id. [141] G..R. No. 93699, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 232 [Per J. Cruz, First Division]. [142] Id. at 239–240, also cited in Triple Eight Integrated Services v. NLRC, 359 Phil. 955, 968 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division]. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BRION, J.: I concur with the ponencia’s conclusion that respondent Joy C. Cabiles was illegally dismissed for lack of valid cause and due process. I likewise concur with the conclusion that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995),[1] as reinstated by R.A. No. 10022,[2] is unconstitutional in so far as it provides that: In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. [Emphasis and italics ours] My conclusion on the constitutionality of the above-quoted clause (subject clause) of Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, however, proceeds from a different reason and constitutional basis. I maintain the view that the subject clause should be struck down for violation of the constitutional provisions in favor of labor, under Section 3, Article XIII, and of the substantive aspect of the due process clause, under Section 1, Article III. Thus, I take exception to the ponencia’s full adoption of the ruling in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al.[3] to the extent that it applies the strict scrutiny standard in invoking the equal protection guarantee. To my mind, the circumstances of this case do not justify the ponencia’s approach of extending and expanding the use of the strict scrutiny standard in invalidating the subject clause (as reinstated in R.A. No. 8042 by R.A. No. 10022). The conclusion that the subject clause created a “suspect” elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/57319 30/39