equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator's intent really was.28 If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of lasciviousness? It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender's intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness.29 Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female.30 Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.31 Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is consummated when the following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of age.32 In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.33 The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her. The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration of this can be seen in People v. Bugarin,34 where the accused was charged with attempted rape through an information alleging that he, by means of force and intimidation, "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away." The accused was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape "is not apparent from the act described," and the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that the "act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse."35