problem of possible human influences on climate.”33 Shell was again a participant.34 EXHIBIT 3 Excerpt from Executive Summary to the 1972 NPC report 1980-1998: New Documents Expose a Growing Dichotomy between Shell’s Knowledge, Rhetoric and Conduct during a Critical Period for Climate Science and Climate Action Environmental Conservation: The Oil and Gas Industries / Volume 2, National Petroleum Council xxii (1972), available at http://www.npc.org/reports/1972- Environmental_Conservation-Oil_and_Gas_ Industries-Vol_II.pdf. Based on scientific studies, on a global aggregate basis, air pollution is not a serious problem . . . . Studies involving international cooperation are needed to define any global effects of air pollution, particularly from man-made sources. While main’s contribution produces localized problems of varying degrees, depending on population density and natural ventilation, there is a question as to the effect of man’s pollution on a global basis in view of nature’s contribution and absorptive capacity.30 Three senior Shell Oil executives, including company President Harold Bridges, were identified as contributors to the report, suggesting familiarity with and endorsement of its contents. L.P. Haxby, Shell’s Manager for Environmental Conservation (and Public Relations) was a member of the six-person Air Conservation Task Group to which A Crack in the Shell | the report’s discussion of air pollutants is attributed. At minimum, this demonstrates Shell was aware of the SRI reports. Shell continued its active engagement in climate research and climate discussions throughout the 1970s. At the same time, Shell made early forays into solar energy. In 1973, Shell acquired industry pioneer Solar Energy Systems and actively published research and filed for patents throughout the 1970s.31 In 1977, Shell participated in the Conference on Energy Resources, which included a discussion of global warming as caused by fossil fuel combustion and carbon dioxide accumulation.32 Two years later, the World Meteorological Organization hosted the World Climate Conference and made explicit and specific reference to the “additional issue of special importance that pervades all the above-mentioned components: The 7 | As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Shell entered the 1980s with nearly three decades of steadily accumulating research and warnings about the potential climate risks linked to its products and operations. By 1980, Shell was unequivocally on notice of those risks, of the increasingly robust body of scientific evidence linking fossil fuels to atmospheric carbon dioxide, and to climate change and climate impacts. The trove of documents unearthed by Jelmer Mommers and De Correspondent exposes not only Shell’s deep awareness of these risks but the growing divergence between that internal awareness, its public assessment of climate science, and, critically, its corporate conduct in the face of mounting climate risks. In 1986, a Shell working group completed a study of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which they then presented in a report called The Greenhouse Effect in 1988.35 This report examined the science of the greenhouse effect, climate scenarios and modeling, and potential impacts from climate change caused by greenhouse gas accumulation. The Greenhouse Effect acknowledged unequivocally that atmospheric CO2 levels were increasing, that Center for International Environmental Law